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Introduction
There is a good deal of frustration surrounding the demining component
of mine action; much stems from the sneaking suspicion that technology
to improve the process already exists. Almost everybody recognises that
humanitarian demining is slow and dangerous, and most see a need to
enhance it. But despite years of research, little has changed in the field:
what's going wrong?
Optimising the process of demining requires much more than the
development and incorporation of high technology. It involves a logical
and coherent approach to welldefined aims. It also requires that many
practical problems that plague field operations be identified and
overcome. The objectives cannot be achieved in isolation; they involve
understanding and building on a process that has evolved as a result of
hardlearned lessons over many years. Without a detailed understanding
of those lessons, the process of refinement will at best be inefficient and,
at worst, totally misdirected.
Until recently, the operational and scientific communities have been
poles apart, with hopelessly inadequate communication between them.
Both are partially to blame: demining management for being so
engrossed in minutiae that they failed to articulate their problems to the
developers and some researchers for having the arrogance to believe that
they could contribute to a process of which they had minimal knowledge
A further obstacle, rarely mentioned, is that some individuals and
organisations do not want to collaborate. For example, some of the hi
tech research has no immediate prospect of benefiting mine clearance but
attracts consistent, substantial funding and offers potentially lucrative
"spinoffs." Equally, some of the demining agencies, having been
disillusioned by a stream of illconceived ideas, now hardly consider the
possibility that new technologies could help them.

Focusing on the Aim: What Are We Trying to Achieve?

Although it may seem obvious, we need to define what we are actually
trying to achieve as a result of "mine action." Perhaps the two foremost
issues are the reduction of casualties among the local population–the
most direct form of human tragedy–and the reclamation of land for the
use of that population. For all its good intentions, these are things that a
landmine ban will never achieve. Banning landmines today will not
make it any safer to walk across a field in Cambodia tomorrow, and no
more of that ground will be usable. So, despite the important role that the
ban has in limiting proliferation, practical mine clearance is a basic
requirement.
It is also important to consider what "enhancing" the process actually
means. Unless new techniques are faster, safer, or fill a capability gap,
they are not truly enhancing the process. Even if they can fulfill one or
more of these criteria, they must be must be readily available (which
basically means affordable) when required.

Primary Factors
It should go without saying that equipment and procedures must work
when and where they are needed, yet all too often this requirement is
neither recognised nor assessed during development. All too often new
equipment is designed without reference to the realities of live minefields
and demonstrated in flat, open environments against unrepresentative
targets.
To develop realistic techniques and procedures that will truly enhance the
process of mine clearance, two primary factors must be considered:
mines and the environment.
Mines: The threat presented by the extensive variety of mines
themselves and the ways in which they are used.
Environment: The limitations imposed by the real minefield
environment, where the ground often rules out whole categories of
techniques and equipment.

Blast mines like these Yugoslav PMA2s are easy to conceal and hard to
detect, but the rip wire is more likely to get you killed.

The OverPublicised Blast Mine
Even within the mine action community there is a stereotype landmine
image: the small "nonmetallic" antipersonnel (AP) blast mine. Many
pressureoperated blast mines are plasticcased and have a minimal metal
content that does, indeed, make them difficult to detect. However, few (if
any) are truly "nonmetallic" or "undetectable": the most thorough
clearance method known, metal detectors and probes, is clear evidence of
this.
The blast mine even has a couple of points in its favour. Firstly, the fuze
requires direct and often fairly substantial pressure (normally several
kilograms). Secondly, the plastic casing creates a very limited
fragmentation hazard and is unlikely to be lethal: there are numerous
examples of deminers escaping accidental detonations with minor
injuries. As with all rules, there are exceptions: mines like the Russian
PMN, whose large explosive charge and Bakelite casing creates
significant fragmentation. But, to the wellprotected operator adhering
strictly to standard operating procedures, blast AP mines are not the
greatest worry. If the reliable detection of minimummetal blast mines
were the only major problem faced by deminers, clearance rates would
be several orders of magnitude greater than they are.

The LesserUnderstood Fragmentation Mine
To the uninitiated, the high metallic content of the fragmentation mine
makes it sound almost deminerfriendly: if it's easy to detect, what's the
problem? Well, there are several problems. To begin with, stake mines,
bounding mines, and Claymoretype directional mines are often initiated
by tripwires. Unlike the
blast mine, direct contact
is not required: this is an
area weapon with an area
fuzing system. And while
most blast mines require
several kilograms of direct
pressure, tripwire
actuation may take as little
as 1 kg. Gone, too, is the
comforting notion of
adequate protection. Not
Fragmentation mines like these Italian V69s often only will a mistake with a
tripwire initiation and substantial range. The dark "frag" mine result in
objects in the background are camels, all killed by serious injury or death, but
the detonation of a single mine.
somebody else's mistake
may get you killed, as
well. The detection of tripwires is every bit as important as the detection

of minimummetal mines, yet attracts a tiny fraction of the research
effort.
Such is the strength of the blast mine stereotype that people often
overlook the fact that fragmentation mines are normally above ground to
maximise their effect. Others tend to believe that being visible, once
again, makes them safer. In many situations, the reality is that the lethal
range of these mines far exceeds the distance at which they can be seen.
In other words, it can see you before you see it. Mines and tripwires
placed well above the ground create a 3dimensional threat, complicating
both location and demolition.
The "effective range"' of fragmentation mines is also debatable: a
Claymore, lethal at 50 m is clearly not safe at 51 m. The presence of
fragmentation mines demands that deminers remain well spread out and
are well protected on all sides. But large safety distances make command
and control considerably
more difficult, while
wearing full protection
decreases awareness and
peripheral vision, increases
fatigue, and can make the
operator dangerously
clumsy.
Incidentally, much of the
protective equipment worn
by deminers was not
designed for that purpose.
This Jordonian deminer is working in a
Most military issue
temperature of 140 degrees F. Though hot and
helmets and body armour
uncomfortable, his armour offers inadequate
are too hot and restrictive
protection.
for prolonged wear in
warm climates and often provide no protection to areas such as the groin
and neck.

Rules of Mine Laying
It is the indiscriminate use of mines that is most devastating to
communities, and, among the "irresponsible" users, there are no rules.
Improvisation makes every aspect of the mine threat unpredictable. The
use of wooden stakes to initiate deep buried mines to avoid detection; the
linking of claymores to create killing zones; the use of AP mines to
initiate large artillery shells or bombs are all examples of improvisation
that a deminer could face in addition to routine clearance.
To complicate the picture further, virtually any mine can be booby
trapped in a variety of different ways. In former Yugoslavia, World War

II British and American
mechanical booby trap
switches are still in use,
complemented by a range
of ingenious, well
designed modern devices.
The presence of booby
traps further limits the
number of techniques
available to the deminer.
Where the mines are
suspected, they must be
A Yugoslav TMA2 with the top removed reveals a uncovered with extreme
"Special Electronic Fuze" melted into the explosive care and pulled out of the
fill. This effectively converts a blast AT mine into a ground remotely or
sophisticated booby trap.
destroyed in place.
Electronic booby traps, which are also used in the former Yugoslavia,
can operate on principles such as light, thermal or acoustic sensitivity,
vibration, tilt, inertia, time delay, or breakwire. In Bosnia, booby traps
like these have been found hidden inside antitank (AT) mines, melted
into the explosive. In Cambodia, the Chinese Type 72B contains an
electronic tilt fuze but is externally identical to the conventional
pressurefuzed Type 72. With such a formidable array of potential traps,
it is almost impossible to devise universal manual mine clearance drills.

The Environment: Killing Fields, Not Playing Fields
The stereotype image of a flat, grassy minefield is just as misleading and
harmful as that of the "nonmetallic" blast mine. Yet the "football pitch"
image is constantly reinforced by the trials, demonstrations, and publicity
shots that invariably take place in nearperfect conditions. Even ignoring
the special circumstances of Kuwait's oil lakes, the Middle East's drifting
sand dunes, Afghanistan's mountains, or the Falklands peat bogs,
minefields are rarely simple.
To begin with, there is
vegetation. Minefields are
not harvested or grazed,
and many lie in the sort of
hot, wet environment that
promotes the rapid growth
of foliage. Most of the
world's minefields have
been in place for years and
many have become totally
overgrown. Not only does
this create a physical

access problem, but the
inability to spot
fragmentation mines and
tripwires makes overgrown minefields particularly dangerous. In some
areas of Cambodia, over 70% of operational time is spent on the
clearance of undergrowth–at the expense of mine clearance.
Training deminers in Bosnia. This misleading
image of flat grassy minefields is also perpetuated
by unrealistic trials and demonstrations.

The minefields of the real world are often uneven on both macro and
micro scales. Rocks of all sizes create problems for the deminer, and
even small stones can make probing almost impossible. On the beaches
in Kuwait–where it actually was reasonably flat–wet stony sand caused
major problems for manual clearance teams. Terrain with steep slopes
and large outcrops of rock, common in Afghanistan and the Falklands,
simply makes the use of most vehicleborne systems impractical. The
forces of nature will invariably ensure that mines migrate to the lowest
area, given time.
An example of this would be a rut or pothole just beyond the reach of a
flail hammer or roller or the bottom of a hill–perhaps outside the known
minefield boundary.

Water is a powerful influence in a minefield, moving mines and creating
obstacles. Erosion in the Jordan Valley minefield has made systematic
clearance almost impossible.

Water is, perhaps, the most significant of the natural influences, with the
capability to carry mines well away from their intended locations.
Erosion can undercut mines in one area and bury them deep under silt
deposits in another. It can also create obstacles impassable to any
mechanical clearance equipment. In the Jordan Valley, the river has cut
3m gullies through mixed
(AP and AT) minefields;
some mines are left
dangling over the cliff
edge while others are
buried under the collapsed
ground. Several miles
downstream, the Sea of
Galilee must be patrolled
daily to check for mines
washed up on the beaches.
Elsewhere, mine clearance

is made almost impossible
by tidal action on the beaches of the Falklands, standing water in the rice
fields of Cambodia, and snow in the minefields of Bosnia. Once again,
water does not feature prominently in most equipment test sites and
display areas.
Winter in a Bosnian minefield

Battle Areas
Not surprisingly, mines are often found in and around battlefields, where
the ground has been contaminated with the scrap of war. At best, there
will be large quantities of metal present: one shell can produce thousands
of steel fragments, and each splinter will be large enough to dwarf the
signature from a minimummetal mine. At worst, the area may be
cratered, strewn with barbed wire and guidance wires from missiles, and
littered with unexploded ordnance (UXO). The failure rate among
conventional munitions is
generally around 10%, and
can be far higher. This
means that the quantity of
UXO can often exceed the
number of mines, as was
the case among the
"Rockeye" submunition
strikes in the Persian Gulf,
where large numbers failed
to function. Most types of
UXO are less hazardous
The presence of an unexploded ordnance is a major than mines, but this is not
complication, and can pose a substantial threat. always so–particularly
Once armed, the KB1 submunition is far more with submunitions. Once
sensitive than any mine fuze.
armed, unexploded dual
purpose bomblets, such as the American M42 or the Yugoslav KB1, are
far more pressure sensitive than any AP mine.

Urban Areas
The word "minefield" strongly conveys a rural setting, yet some of the
most awkward and dangerous minefields are in urban areas. In most
cases, the presence of buildings, walls, fences, paths, and roads makes
the use of mechanical equipment impossible, and detection techniques
are hampered by the large quantities of metal present. Inside buildings,
where virtually any type of booby trap may have been used, the
clearance procedures are often similar to those needed in a counter
terrorist environment, such as Northern Ireland. In Afghanistan, the
collapse of mud walls and subsequent remining have created layers of
mines–sometimes to a depth of several feet.

Another important
consideration is
infrastructure–or rather the
lack of it. Communications
and repair facilities are
strictly limited in most
heavily mined thirdworld
countries. We also tend to
assume that road and rail
networks are universally
available for the
movement of heavy
Minefields are not always rural. Manmade
equipment, but, in some
obstacles prevent the use of mechanical clearance areas, routes have become
techniques, while the extensive presence of metal virtually impassable. Even
hampers detection.
where suitable tracks still
exist, few of the bridges can cope with anything more than a domestic
4x4. Mobility, survivability, and 'sustainability' are therefore key
considerations for new demining equipment.

Summary
Most of these factors would create significant problems if they were
encountered in isolation, but, unfortunately, they are superimposed onto
each other. The result is a complex, unpredictable tangle of mines and
tripwires among manmade and natural obstacles. In the Falklands, for
instance, there are steep, rocky slopes with soft grassy patches, crossed
by streams and littered with wire, shrapnel, and UXO.
At this point, perhaps it is appropriate to return to the principles outlined
in the introduction, assuming our primary aims are to reduce casualties
and return land to the population. To attain these objectives, we seek to
enhance the mine
clearance component of
mine action. Enhancing
means making safer,
faster, cheaper or a new
capability–n other words
finding solutions to
overcome existing
problems.
On close examination of
the real issues, it emerges
Obstacles are often compounded. In the Falklands that much of the
high winds, water, soft ground, rocks, UXO, and technology under
development will have, at
shrapnel combine to hinder demining.
best, limited application. Sadly, some research has been so misguided

best, limited application. Sadly, some research has been so misguided
that the effort was totally wasted. The detection of minimummetal
mines, seen by so many as the holy grail of demining, is only one of
many problems faced by the deminer. Gradually, both the scientific and
mine clearance communities are realizing that a selection of equipment
and techniques are required, closely tailored to the specific threat in each
minefield. Both communities are, at last, beginning to understand the
need for communication–even if they still do not fully understand each
other's position.
There are major practical problems to be overcome to enhance the
process of demining. The number of permutations arising from the array
of mines and variety of environments guarantee that there will be no
universal solution. Those that say the process has remained unchanged
since World War II are wrong. It has been continually modified through
the revision of procedures and the incorporation of new technology, but
the overall capability has not been greatly improved. The key to
significant enhancement is to ensure that new techniques are well
conceived, steered through development, and applied appropriately.

